Abstract We consider the utility maximization problem of terminal wealth from the point of view of a portfolio manager paid by an incentive scheme given as a convex function g of the terminal wealth. The manager's own utility function U is assumed to be smooth and strictly concave, however the resulting utility function U • g fails to be concave. As a consequence, this problem does not fit into the classical portfolio optimization theory. Using duality theory, we prove wealth-independent existence and uniqueness of the optimal wealth in general (incomplete) semimartingale markets as long as the unique optimizer of the dual problem has a continuous law. In many cases, this fact is independent of the incentive scheme and depends only on the structure of the set of equivalent local martingale measures. As examples we discuss (complete) one-dimensional models as well as (incomplete) lognormal mixture models. We provide also a detailed analysis of the case when this criterium fails, leading to optimization problems whose solvability by duality methods depends on the initial wealth of the investor.
Introduction
Whereas classical portfolio theory studies utility maximization by an investor (the principal) with a preference structure represented by a concave utility function, in reality the fund management is commonly delegated to a portfolio manager (the agent). To increase the efficiency of the manager, he is often paid by an incentive scheme depending on the performance of the fund he manages. Such a scheme can be composed, for example, of a fixed fee, some percentage of the fund plus an additional rewarding component consisting of one (or a combination of several) call options on the fund. As a consequence, two differences to the classical setting arise: Firstly, the utility function, under which the optimization is carried out does not represent the preference structure of the investor, but rather the agent's. Secondly, what is optimized under this utility function is not the terminal value of the fund itself, but rather some function of it, depending on the concrete incentive scheme.
The resulting optimization problem is in general no longer concave, thus does not fit into the classical setting as first studied by Merton [16] . He used stochastic optimal control, derived a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation satisfied by the value function, and found a closed form solution, in case of power utility. The drawback of this approach, namely that it requires the state process to be Markov, can be overcome by using the fact that the processes dual to the portfolio processes are given via the set of equivalent martingale measures. This approach was pioneered first by Karatzas, Lehoczky and Shreve [12] and Pliska [21] in complete markets, and later thoroughly studied in a general semimartingale, incomplete market setting by Kramkov and Schachermayer [13] , [14] , Bouchard, Touzi and Zeghal [2] and others.
As pointed out, all of the above literature concentrated on the principal investing himself. The problem becomes more involved, if the investor, instead of investing himself, delegates his money to a fund manager. The agent would invest on his behalf, in exchange for a fee schedule based on the fund's performance at the final time T and given by a function g. We assume that the agent's utility function U is smooth and strictly concave, and that the fee schedule function g is convex, with a maximum slope of 1. The financial reasoning for these assumptions on g is that we expect the fees proportion to increase as the fund's profit increases, and hence g should be convex. Moreover, to ensure that an increase of the fund's performance would also be profitable for the investor or at least not detriment, we have to cap the maximum slope of g at 1. The fund manager's resulting utility from the payoff is hence a composition of the two functions,Ū := U • g, and may no longer be concave, and thus the previously mentioned results are no longer applicable.
The arising problem is not well understood and the literature discusses mainly the question whether such a compensation scheme leads the portfolio manager to take excessive risk. In his paper Ross [23] , discusses some conditions to make the agent more or less risk averse then the principal. Carpenter in [6] discussed the existence of fund manager's optimal portfolio in case of a utility function U with constant absolute risk aversion and a call option like fee schedule g in a Brownian stock price model. In this setting, her analysis was generalized by Larsen [15] into an agency problem, where the investor optimizes the resulting payoff over piecewise affine incentive schemes, which he might offer the portfolio manager.
We want to point out that there is also a different approach to portfolio optimization under incentive schemes, where the compensation is based on high-watermarks, i.e. the running maximum of the fund. Recent references to this compensation approach include [9] , [11] , [20] . In all those papers the authors also assume a Brownian stock price model and solve the appropriate HJB equation.
In this paper, we will investigate the more fundamental problem of existence and uniqueness of a agent's optimal investment portfolio in a general semimartingale model. As noted above, the resulting fund manager's utility function U may not be concave. It is well known that the solution is then to concavify it, and solve the concavified problem instead. Even though this new utility is now concave, it is not necessarily strictly concave, or satisfies the usual Inada condition at zero, all needed in the classical utility maximization framework. Moreover, the smoothness of the concavified function is not clear a priori. Using a dynamic programming approach via HJB equation is -at least in the straightforward way -also not possible, since the concavified utility function can (and usually will) be affine in some parts, and hence finding the optimal portfolio there becomes impossible. Thus we have effectively to weaken the utility function requirement of Kramkov and Schachermayer [13] . We can use the more general framework of Bouchard, Touzi and Zeghal [2] and, by proving the additional regularity of the concavified utility function, we are also able to conclude the uniqueness of the dual optimizer. We are thus able to utilize the abstract framework of Bouchard, Touzi and Zeghal in a concrete setting, which is a rare feat -note however the exception of Seifried [24] , who discusses capital gains taxes in a complete market. The next step is to develop sufficient conditions, broad enough to be of interest, for the solution of the concavified problem to be also the solution of the original problem. It turns out that a necessary and sufficient condition, therefore, is that the corresponding unique dual optimizer has a continuous law (i.e. the distribution of the random variable has no atoms). A similar procedure can be found in a related paper by Carassus and Pham [5] , who consider a problem of portfolio optimization in a complete market with Brownian stock price, with a utility function created by two piecewise concave functions. We show, that the atomlessness condition holds not only true in the classical Black-Scholes model with discounted stock price having nonzero drift, but provide in the appendix two classes examples of markets where it is satisfied -independently of the initial capital of the fund and independently of the concrete incentive schemes: (complete market) one-dimensional Itô-process models (such as local volatility models) and (incomplete market) lognormal mixture models.
The practical consequence of this is that the agent shuns successfully away from any part of the domain where the concavified utility function is flat. However, he does this in a smooth way: the optimal terminal wealth has no atoms except possibly at zero (meaning that the fund manager jeopardizes the fund with a positive probability), and it is zero under any linear spot of the concavified utility function.
If the assumption on the atomic structure of the dual optimizers fails, we are still able to give an affirmative answer, howbeit only for some initial capitals. In general, the fund manager's optimal wealth does not have to agree with the one calculated from the concavified problem, and even if it does, it does not have to be unique. As a note of caution we present easy counterexamples that this method should not be implemented without proper conditions. We also give simple examples for our theorems, which present the concept how the optimal portfolio can be explicitly calculated in a complete market setting.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the market model and review setting and results of Kramkov and Schachermayer [13] and the weakening on the assumptions on the utility function by Bouchard, Touzi and Zeghal [2] . In Section 3 we outline the concavification approach, show that the concavified utility function satisfies the assumptions of Bouchard, Touzi and Zeghal and prove existence and uniqueness of the dual problem. The next two sections explore the conditions, under which solutions of the original problem and the concavified problem match -first independently and then depending on the initial capital. Additionally, we present the main examples and counterexamples here. Along the way we discuss the occurrence of the phenomenon that the fund manager takes excessive risk, and explain how to avoid it. Finally, in the Appendix, along with a proof of a technical theorem, we present an application of our general method to specific (complete and incomplete) market models.
After finishing a first version of the present paper, we have learnt of the work of Reichlin [22] , who studies the utility maximization problem for more general non-concave utility functions under a fixed pricing measure.
Utility Maximization in the Smooth and Non-smooth Case
We review first the known results on utility maximization in a general semimartingale framework. Assume that S i , i = 1, . . ., d is a d-dimensional, locally bounded semimartingale on a filtered probability space (Ω, F , (F t ) 0≤t≤T , P), representing discounted stock price processes; without loss of generality we assume F T = F . We focus on portfolio processes with initial capital x and admissible, that is predictable and S -integrable, strategies H. The value process of such a portfolio is then given by
Denote by X(x) the set of all nonnegative wealth processes with initial capital x,
We are interested in studying the optimization problem
with initial capital x under the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 To make the problem nontrivial, we assume that for U there exists at least some x 0 > 0 such that 
c) Moreover, it satisfies the asymptotic elasticity condition
Before introducing the dual problem, we recall some notions and notations of convex analysis: A function f : U ⊆ R → [−∞, ∞] defined on some convex domain U is called convex (resp. concave) if its epigraph (resp. hypograph)
is a convex set. The effective domain of a convex function f is defined as
and similarly for a concave function as the points in the pre-image not mapping to −∞. Generalizing the usual notations from utility maximization problems in an obvious way, we define for any function f dominated by some affine function its convex conjugate f * and its biconjugate f * * by
and note that f * * is the concavification of f , i.e. the hypograph of f * * is the closed convex hull of the hypograph of f , hypo f * * = co (hypo f ). We note that f * is the convex conjugate of − f (− · ) in the classical sense of convex analysis and we will use standard results of convex analysis (cf. e.g. [10] ) with the obvious modifications without further notice. Then the minimization problem dual to (2.2) is given by 
Moreover,X(x)Ŷ(y) is a uniformly integrable martingale. c) Additionally we have
Asymptotic elasticity is the minimal condition to assure the duality result in general semimartingale models for smooth utility functions (cf. [13] ). (If one poses a joint condition on model and utility function, then the minimal condition is the finiteness of the dual value function, cf. [14] .) In the nonsmooth case, it turns out that the asymptotic elasticity has, following Deelstra, Pham, and Touzi [7] , to be written on the convex conjugate of the utility function. The following general result is due to Bouchard, Touzi and Zeghal [2, Theorem 3.2.], a simplification of the proof can be found in Westray and Zheng [25, Theorem 5.1.] .
We relax the conditions on the utility function U, to assume only that U : (α, ∞) → R, α ∈ R, is nonconstant, nondecreasing and concave (we extend U again continuously to [α, ∞), allowing the value −∞ at α and still assuming that U(∞) > 0). In particular we no longer assume that U is continuously differentiable on (α, ∞) nor require U to be strictly increasing or strictly concave. Finally, we no longer impose Inada conditions, but merely that the closure of the domain of the dual function is R ≥0 . As mentioned above, the asymptotic elasticity condition will be written on the dual function. Hence we substitute the following assumption for Assumption 3 
is a uniformly integrable martingale and
c) Additionally we have
however the infimum is in general not attained in M e .
Note that the subdifferential-valued random variables in part b) have really to be understood as random variables whose range is a subset of the image of a random variable under a set-valued function. This is a much larger set then just the collection of random variables one gets by picking only fixed elements in the subdifferential and looking on images under these mappings. In the first case we can have a different mapping for every ω ∈ Ω, whereas in the second case one fixes one and the same function for all ω.
Remark 2.4
We adapted here the statement of [2] and [25] to fit better in a unified framework with [13] , the different formulations in these papers stem from their goal of the proof of the result for utility functions on the whole real line with random initial endowment. However, their formulations (in terms of processes or terminal random variables) are equivalent for our case (without random endowment): These are (using the terminology of Kramkov/Schachermayer) the concrete and the abstract side of the same problem. What works behind the scenes is that the set of nonnegative F T -measurable random variables dominated by some Y T (y), Y(y) ∈ Y(y), is the bipolar of the set y dQ dP : Q ∈ M e , due to the bipolar theorem on the cone of nonnegative random variables by Brannath and Schachermayer [3] , for details see [13, Proposition 3.1 and Section 4].
We finally note that the solutions are in general not unique and the value function may not be smooth. Moreover, there may well exist a random variable Z ∈ −∂U * Ŷ T (y) satisfying E[ZŶ T (y)] = xy, which is not dominated by the terminal value of any X(x) ∈ X(x), as shown by Westray and Zheng in [26] .
The Dual and the Concavified Problem
We want to look on the portfolio optimization problem from the portfolio manager's perspective. Therefore we understand under an incentive scheme a function g : R ≥0 → R ≥0 , nonconstant, nondecreasing, convex and with maximal slope 1, i.e.
We note that the agent's private capital can be absorbed into g (if positive). The utility function U : (0, ∞) → R is assumed to be as nice as in the original Kramkov/Schachermayer setting. Concretely, we assume besides Assumption 2 also the properties of Assumption 3 for U and also the nontriviality Assumption 1 for the classical utility optimization problem. These are the standing assumptions for the rest of this paper. SettingŪ := U •g, the portfolio manager's utility maximization problem looks now
Instead of analyzing this non-concave problem directly, we will first consider the concavified problem
Note that both problems share the dual problem, i.e.
v(y) := inf
From now on these value functions will always refer to the problems under the convex incentive scheme, i.e. to the problems derived from the utility functionŪ (and not from U).
In general the concavified utility functionŪ * * will be neither strictly concave nor satisfy the Inada condition at 0, hence we will have to rely on the results for nonsmooth utility maximization. Therefore we have first to assure that U * * satisfies all the conditions of Theorem 2.3 and collect some properties of this function.
Proposition 3.1
For the concavified utility functionŪ * * we have
and together with its conjugateŪ * it enjoys the following regularity properties:Ū * * is continuously differentiable on (β, ∞);Ū * is strictly convex on the whole domain if U(0) = −∞, otherwise it is strictly convex on 0, Ū * * ′ (0) and
Finally,Ū * * satisfies Assumption 1 and Assumption 4.
We give the elementary, but rather technical proof of this result in Appendix A. We can now look closer how the concavified problem relates to the classical Kramkov/Schachermayer setting: The concavified utility functionŪ * * is indeed continuously differentiable, and it will follow from (A.3) that it satisfies also the Inada condition Ū * * ′ (∞) = 0 and hence by [7, Proposition 4.1.] also the primal asymptotic elasticity condition AE Ū * * < 1. However, it fails in general the Inada condition Ū * * ′ (0) = ∞ as well as it will be not necessarily strictly concave.
Relying heavily on Proposition 3.1, we can now give the result on existence and uniqueness of an optimal solution of the dual problem (3.3) as well as existence for the concavified problem (3.2). In the next sections we will use this central result to discuss the uniqueness of the concavified problem as well as how one can use the concavified problem to solve the original problem (3.1). 
Theorem 3.2 For the utility optimization problem under a convex incentive scheme g it holds that that
Proof It follows from Proposition 3.1 that the conditions of Theorem 2.3 are satisfied with α = β for the concavified utility functionŪ * * . This implies the finiteness, duality and asymptotic ellipticity statement of a). The existence part of b) follows also directly from Theorem 2.3, for the uniqueness part we note that part b) of Theorem 2.3 together with Proposition 3.1 implies thatŶ T (y) = Ū * ′ W T (x) ≤ Ū * ′ (β) =: δ (which is allowed to be infinity), thusŪ * is strictly convex in the whole range ofŶ T (y). Assume thatŶ 1 T (y) andŶ 2 T (y) are the terminal distributions of two different optimizers of the dual problem. It follows that for every λ ∈ (0, 1) and
T (y) we have by the strict convexity ofŪ * that
contradicting the optimality ofŶ 1 T (y), orŶ 2 T (y). To prove the remaining statements of a) we note that we have for every λ ∈ (0, 1) we have for y 1 
Thus we can conclude by the strict convexity ofŪ * that for λ ∈ (0, 1), and 0 < y 1 
The Original Problem: Wealth-independent Solution
Next we turn to the original problem, first proving results in a 'global' setting, i.e. where the existence of a solution to (3.1) does not depend on the initial capital x. It turns out that a sufficient condition therefore is that the terminal distribution of the optimizer of the dual problem has a continuous law. First we have to look on the differences between the original (3.1) and the concavified (3.2) problems (the proofs of the following statements can be found in the proof of Lemma A.2): The set, where the two utility functions disagree, is an open subset of R >0 and as such is a union of open intervals,
On every one of these intervals the functionŪ * * is affine,Ū * * (x) = γ n x + α n for some γ n ∈ R >0 , α n ∈ R, and {γ n } being a strictly decreasing sequence. We set
and note that on every γ n the dual utility functionŪ * has a kink, i.e. is not continuously differentiable. We insist that not every kink ofŪ * has to lie in Γ, nor is every region of linearity ofŪ * * necessarily contained in A (e.g. when U = U • g is itself concave and has regions of linearity). However, by the duality relationship ofŪ * * andŪ * we know that for the subdifferentials Ū * * ′ (A) = Γ and − ∂Ū * (Γ) = A (4.1)
holds true. Proof Given thatŶ T (y) has a continuous law and is unique in any case, it follows that for any f 1 , f 2 ∈ −∂Ū * we have that
is P-a.s. uniquely defined by a strictly increasing function f , and sinceŶ T w ′ (x) has a continuous law, so doesŴ T (x), proving a).
By the duality relationship (4.1) we can conclude that
since the distribution ofŶ T (y) has no atoms for any y > 0. ThusŴ T (x) is P-a.s. equal to 0 on A. Thus we have on the one hand
Since on the other hand
it is clear thatŴ(x) is also an optimizer for the original problem,X(x) =Ŵ(x), proving b).
⊓ ⊔
Note that herewith nothing is said about the optimal portfolio of the original problem per se, but only about the coincidence of its maximizer with that of the concavified problem, i.e. the statement is that when the law of the dual optimizer has no atoms, then there is no 'biduality gap', and the original problem can be solved by considering the problem with the concavified utility function.
The following remark discusses the economic consequences of Theorem 4.1:
a) The optimizerX(x) of Theorem 3.2 satisfiesX T (x) A, P-a.s., i.e. the portfolio manager flees successfully all possible outcomes, which underperform the concavification. b) Similar to the calculation in (4.2) we can show that the law ofX T (x) is atomless, except possibly an atom at β.
Indeed, by Theorem 4.1 it is enough to show that the distribution ofŴ T (x) is atomless, as it coincides withX T (x) a.s. Take z > β and f ∈ −∂Ū * , thenŴ T (x) = f Ŷ T w ′ (x) and
However, there is a possibility that an atom occurs at z = β: The same calculation shows that if (Ū * * ) ′ (β) = ∞ then the distribution ofX T (x) cannot have an atom at β. Specifically, the lawX T (x) has an atom at β if and only if (Ū * * ) ′ (β) < ∞ and P Ŷ T w ′ (x) ≥Ū(0) > 0. Moreover, in this case,
This outcome, which occurs, for example, by pure call option payoffs in Black-Scholes markets with nonzero drift, is not very satisfactory for the investor as the incentive scheme for the portfolio manager is such that the optimal strategy jeopardizes the whole capital with positive probability. Even worse: a call option incentive scheme leads with a higher probability to the ruin as the benchmark increases. c) Carpenter [6] also considers the case of a call option with random benchmark, g(x) = (x − B T ) + . It is not to hard to integrate such options also in our more general framework as long as B T ∈ L ∞ (Ω, F , P), using the random endowment result of [2, Theorem 3.2.].
Next we present a small example to illustrate our findings. We will later come back to this model to show which consequences one can get in the case that the law of the dual optimizer has an atom.
Example 4.3
Assume that the discounted stock price is modeled by S t = exp W t + (µ − 1/2)t , µ > 0, for some Brownian motion W generating the filtration (F t ). The incentive scheme is given by g(x) = 1 2 (x − 3) + , and the portfolio optimizer's utility function is U(x) = √ 2x. We find that Tedious, but straightforward stochastic calculus reveals the following results: The dual value function is given by
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution. Thus v is continuously differentiable and strictly concave on the whole real line, whence using the fact that w * = v, w is also strictly concave and continuously differentiable on R >0 . For the terminal value of the optimizer we get (we can use almost everywhere defined derivatives since the law ofŶ T has no atoms)
Finally, in this case one can also directly calculate which strategy leads to this optimizer: (Ab-)using [19, Theorem
4.2], we define h(x) as the inverse of the strictly increasing function y · v(y) and get
Before we analyze the problem further, we want to discuss first the condition that the distribution of the dual optimizer has no atoms. At a first glance this conditions seems quite abstract and hard to check. Therefore we will present next a sufficient condition in terms of equivalent martingale measures, which can be checked much easier in many concrete models. Hence we can in particular extract a sequence Z n ∈ dQ dP : Q ∈ M e such that E Ū * (yZ n ) converges to v(y). Note that the sequence Z n is bounded in L 1 (Ω, F , P) , since the expectations of densities are bounded by one. Hence we can apply Komlós' Lemma ([1, Theorem 4.27]) to find a subsequence Z n k and a random variable Z such that every subsequence Z n k l of Z n k converges to Z, P-a.s. in the sense of Cesàro. We note that Z is a minimizer of (4.4) since
Proposition 4.4 Assume that the laws of the Radon-Nikodym derivatives Z T
By the convexity ofŪ * , the right hand converges as Cesàro-subsequence of a convergent sequence to v(y). Whereas the convex combination of the random variables on the left hand is the density corresponding to some equivalent local martingale measure by the convexity of M e . Next, we assert that Z has a distribution, which has a continuous law. Indeed, since the laws of all the approximating Z n are uniformly absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, so are the approximating Cesàro sums. Denote them byZ n . Uniform absolute continuity with respect to Lebesgue measure of the laws ofZ n , implies that for the respective cumulative distribution functions it holds that for every ε > 0 and all t ∈ R there exists a δ = δ(ε) > 0 that sup n sup t∈R |FZn(t + δ) − FZn(t)| < ε. We have thatZ n → Z in distribution, so FZn → F Z at all points of continuity of the cumulative distribution function F Z . To prove our assertion, it is enough to show that F Z (x) is continuous for every x ∈ R. Indeed, since F Z is increasing and bounded, it has at most countable number of discontinuity points. Take for given ε > 0 some x 1 , x 2 ∈ R, x 1 < x < x 2 , such that x 2 − x 1 < δ ε 3 , and that F Z is continuous at both, x 1 and x 2 . Then FZn(x 2 ) − FZn(x 1 ) < ε 3 for all n ∈ N, we can also chose n big enough such that FZn(x i ) − F Z (x i ) < ε 3 , i = 1, 2, and we can conclude that for all y ∈ [x 1 , x 2 ]
thus F Z is continuous at x. ⊓ ⊔ Remark 4.5 The proof becomes even simpler, if one switches to the more abstract level of the bipolar theorem on L 0 + (Ω, F , P) of [3] : The set of nonnegative random variables dominated by elements of Y(y) is the bipolar of y dQ dP : Q ∈ M e , i.e. the smallest solid, convex set closed in the sense of convergence in probability that contains y dQ dP : Q ∈ M e . Thus, every element in this set is given as a limit of y times a Radon-Nikodym derivative, thus by Riesz theorem we can extract a subsequence, which converges almost surely. Moreover, in this abstract perspective we are able to give the following interpretation: The optimizer of utility maximization under a convex incentive scheme is in particular well behaved (i.e. atomless) if the whole set of possible optimizers is well behaved, and this set is (up to a multiplicative factor) nothing else then the bipolar of the set of Radon-Nikodym derivatives of equivalent local martingale measures. Thus if this set is nice enough (i.e. its elements are uniformly absolute continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure), we get always a unique optimizer for utility maximization under convex incentive schemes, independently of the initial capital and the concrete choice of the incentive scheme.
The assumption of this proposition are satisfied in the Black-Scholes model with nonzero drift, but we will show in Appendix B that it is also satisfied in many complete and incomplete market models.
The Original Problem: Wealth-dependent Solution
To motivate the further analysis, we will next look to a simple modification of Example 4.3: Instead of a geometric Brownian motion with positive drift, we look now what happens when the drift is zero.
Example 5.1 As in Example 4.3 we assume that the incentive scheme is given by g(x) = 1 2 (x − 3) + , the portfolio optimizer's utility function is U(x) = √ 2x, leading to the same composed, concavified and dual utility functions as there. However, the discounted stock price is now modeled by S t = exp W t − t/2 . Thus we have M e = {P} with Z T = dP dP | F T = 1 which has an atom of mass one at 1. Hence the dual value function is given by v(y) =Ū * (y) and thus using the fact that w * = v we have for the concavified problem w(x) =Ū * * (x).
Consider first the case x = 1, whence w(1) = √ 3/6. This optimum is of course attained by the trivial strategy H ≡ 0 yielding the optimal wealth processŴ(1) ≡ 1 for the concavified problem. However, plugging this into the original problem yields E Ū Ŵ T (1) = 0. ThusŴ (1) is an optimizer for the concavified problem, but yields a smaller value for the original problem. Moreover,Ŵ T (1) is even not an optimizer for the primal problem, since using a nonzero constant strategy H = n, it follows that X 1,H t = exp (nW t − n 2 t/2) which is trivially nonnegative and yields u(1) > 0 for n 0. A way out of this problem in this example can be seen by thinking in terms of investment strategies. Not only the trivial strategy H ≡ 0 leads to the optimum for the concavified problem, but so does every strategy with terminal valuê W T (1) satisfying suppŴ T (1) ⊆ [0, 6]: In the interval [0, 6] the concavified utility functionŪ * * is linear, whence by the martingale property of the wealth process under P, we have E Ū * * Ŵ T (1) = 3/ √ 6. However, any strategy yielding a terminal valueŴ T (1), which has some support in (6, ∞) is clearly not optimal by the strict concavity of the concavified utility function. Finally, a strategy, which maximizes not only the concavified problem, but also yields also the same value for original problem has to satisfy suppX T (1) = suppŴ T (1) = {0, 6} sinceŪ <Ū * * on (0, 6).
The only remaining question is if such a strategy exists. Indeed, we will directly construct one by using a strategy similar to the classical doubling strategy in the Black-Scholes model -however, in our case the strategy will be admissible. Define the strategy
, which gives rise to the value process
We note that X 1,H is a local martingale with quadratic variation process
hence it is a time changed Brownian motion X
. Defining now the stopping time τ := inf{t ≥ 0 : X
1,H t
[0, 6]} we can see that we have for the stopped strategy
Thus the process X 1,H τ hits almost surely either 0 or 6 before time T and the stopped process at terminal time, X 1,H τ T , is hence almost surely concentrated on {0, 6}. Thus H τ is indeed a strategy which yields the optimum. We finally remark that the distribution of X 1,H τ T can be calculated explicitely, yielding that the unique solution is characterized by
The current example reveals yet an other interesting fact: While the dual optimizerŶ T (y) = y is purely atomic for ever y > 0, nevertheless for x ≥ 6 it follows that w(x) =Ū * * (x) =Ū(x) is reached also by the trivial strategy H ≡ 0, however, in this case the solution of the concavified and the original problem coincide. This means that the condition of the atomlessness of the dual optimizer is not a necessary one, at least as one does not require an existence result which is independent of the initial capital.
Inspired by this example, we try no to figure out how we can use Theorem 3.2 to get existence and/or uniqueness results for particular initial conditions. Therefore we need a little bit of additional information. For y > 0 we denote by ∆(y) = δ > 0 : P Ŷ T (y) = δ > 0 the at most countable set of atoms of the law of the dual optimizerŶ T (y). Moreover we recall the notations
γ n where γ n was the slope ofŪ * * on the flat spot (a − n , a + n ). We can now make the following statement.
Theorem 5.2 The optimizerŴ(x) for the concavified problem (3.2) is unique for x > β if
∆ w ′ (x) ∩ Γ = ∅. (5.1)
Moreover, in this case,X(x) =Ŵ(x) is the unique solution to the original problem (3.1).
Proof First, note that the condition (5.1) implies that no atom of the distribution ofŶ T w ′ (x) lies on a point in the domain ofŪ * where this function is not differentiable. Thus, we can conclude as in the proof of Theorem 4.1 that for
is P-a.s. uniquely defined by a strictly increasing function f , proving uniqueness. To prove existence, we know from (5.1) that P Ŷ T w ′ (x) = γ n = 0. Thus, similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can conclude thatX T (x) is (the unique) solution to the original problem. ⊓ ⊔
In the case that x > β is such that ∆ w ′ (x) ∩ Γ ∅, we cannot generally recover any of our results. In particular:
a) The optimizer of the concavified problem has not to be unique, as discussed in Example 5.1.
b) It can happen that the optimum of the concavified problem is not reached by the value process of the original problem, i.e. u(x) < w(x). An example therefore will be given below in Example 5.3. c) Even if the maximum of the concavified problem can be reached by the original value function, i.e. u(x) = w(x), it may happen that the optimizer of the original problem is not unique. To see this, we use the setting of Example 5.1 (with initial capital 1), changing only the incentive scheme to bě
which is a convex function with slope bounded by one. However U •ǧ =Ū * * , thus all of the solutions of the concavified problem in Example 5.1 are also solutions to the original problem with incentive schemeǧ.
Example 5.3
To see that the optimizer of the concavified problem can be strictly bigger then any admissible terminal value for the original problem, we use again the same utility function and incentive scheme as in Examples 4.3 and 5.1, namely U(x) = √ 2x and g(x) = 1 2 (x − 3) + , and take also x = 1 as initial capital. To describe the discounted stock price process, we fix an (Ω, F , P)-measurable random variable R that satisfies P[R = 2] = P[R = 1/2] = 1/2 and consider the process
in its natural filtration. We note that
, and M e = {Q}, where the measure Q is given via the Radon-Nikodym derivative
Our goal is to show that u(1) < w (1) . To compute u(1) = sup X(1)∈X(1) E Ū X T (1) , we note that for any predictable,
Since X(1) ∈ X(1) has to be nonnegative, it follows that H T/2 ∈ [−1, 2], hence 0 ≤ X
1,H
T ≤ 3, and we can conclude that
For the calculation of w(1) we use the fact that in a complete market, M e = {Q}, thus the dual value function can be directly computed via the unique dual optimizerŶ T (y) = yZ T ,
Calculating now the subdifferential,
and using convex duality that y = w ′ (x) if and only if x ∈ −∂v(y), we conclude that for x = 1 it follows that w ′ (1) = √ 3/4. Thus Theorem 2.3 implies that
and we can conclude by the admissibility constraint
This can be seen also in a simpler way. Since X
H t dS t depends only on H T/2 which by sake of predictability has to be F T/2− = F 0 -measurable and hence constant, we have by admissibility −1 ≤ H ≤ 2 and hence
The maximum is achieved with H = 2, i.e. the optimal portfolio isŴ T (1) = 31l {S T =2} + 01l {S T = 
Conclusion
We have considered the non-concave utility maximization problem as it appears from the point of view of a fund manager, who manages the capital for an investor and who is compensated by a convex incentive scheme. We have proved the existence and uniqueness of the dual optimizer and also proved the existence and uniqueness of the original problem for arbitrary initial capital in case that the dual optimizer has a continuous distribution. We have showed that this is true in a large class of (also incomplete) market models, independently of the specific incentive scheme. When this condition fails, we have proved the existence of a unique solution for the concavified problem and showed that this solution is also a solution to the original problem under additional assumptions on the initial capital. However, there are models, where for some initial capital the optimal value of the concavified problem cannot be reached, as we have showed in a counterexample. Moreover, we have illustrated our findings by specific examples that contain in nuce the explicit solution strategies for complete markets and have discussed the economic implications of our findings.
A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3.1
We will split the proof of Proposition 3.1 into three lemmata, which together reassemble the whole content of the proposition: Proof Consider first the case U(0) > −∞. Note that sinceŪ is continuous, its epigraph is closed and thusŪ * * is its concave hull. Thus by Caratheodory's theorem (cf. [10, Theorem A.1.3.6.]) we know that
Since hypoŪ ⊆ R ≥0 × R, it follows that the linear combination has to be the trivial, i.e 0,Ū * * (0) ∈ hypoŪ andŪ(0) =Ū * * (0) > −∞. Thus it follows that domŪ * * = [0, ∞) = [β, ∞).
Similarly if U(0) = −∞: Note first that if g(0) > 0, we haveŪ(0) > −∞ and β = 0 and can thus conclude exactly as in the previous case domŪ * * = [β, ∞). However, if g(0) = 0, we know by the definition of β thatŪ(x 0 ) is real valued if and only if x 0 ∈ (β, ∞). In this case, the assumption thatŪ * * (β) > −∞ leads to a contradiction by Caratheodory's theorem. It follows thatŪ * * (β) =Ū(β) and hence domŪ * * = (β, ∞). Putting the information of all three cases together we recover the statement domŪ * * = [β, ∞).
Set now b := g(β) and note thatŪ(x) ≤ U(x + b). It follows that
is finite by Theorem 2.1, whenceŪ satisfies Assumption 1. Moreover, we have for y > 0 
We note explicitly that a − 1 = β and a + n = ∞ for some n are allowed. On every of the intervals in A the functionŪ * * is affine (the straight linear interpolation betweenŪ(a − n ) andŪ(a + n )) and hence we can write it there as U * * (x) = γ n x + α n for some γ n ∈ R >0 , α n ∈ R, and {γ n } being a strictly decreasing sequence. Thus, clearlyŪ * * is differentiable in A.
Denote now by B the open interior of the set whereŪ andŪ * * agree, i.e. B := {x > β :Ū(x) =Ū * * (x)} • . We will prove next that on the set B the functionŪ is continuously differentiable. Pick some point x ∈ B. Since g is convex, it holds that g ′ r (x) ≥ g ′ l (x), where g ′ r , g ′ l are the left-and right hand derivatives respectively. Thus it follows by the differentiability of
. But on the other hand the concavity ofŪ
Thus the left-and right-derivatives have to agree for every x ∈ B, and we conclude that the function is continuously differentiable there.
Finally, since A ∪ B ∞ n=1 {a ± n } \ {+∞} = R ≥0 , it remains only to prove the continuous differentiability on the points a ± n ∈ R >0 . Without loss of generality, assume indirectly thatŪ * * is not continuously differentiable at some a − n . Then it follows that
The first inequality stems from the fact that every point of non-differentiability ofŪ stems from g which is convex, the second one from the fact thatŪ * * is the concave hull ofŪ (and both functions agree on a − n ): Indeed using the concavity ofŪ * * and the fact thatŪ(a − n ) =Ū * * (a − n ) we write ,
However, (A.1) leads to a contradiction, since by a similar argument
thusŪ * * has to be continuously differentiable in a − n -and hence on the whole interval (β, ∞). In passing we note that the differentiability ofŪ * * implies thatŪ * cannot be differentiable at any γ n : Assume indirectly it would be differentiable, then there exists someã ∈ R such that − Ū * ′ (γ n ) =ã and convex duality implies γ n ∈ ∂Ū * * (ã). However, the differentiability ofŪ * * reduces the subdifferential to a singleton. This means that γ n can only be the slope ofŪ * * at the single pointã -which is in contradiction to the fact that it is the slope on the whole interval (a − n , a + n ). Finally to show b), we note that the strict convexity in the range of the gradient mapping is a classical consequence in convex Analysis, see e.g. [10, Theorem E.4.1.2.], i.e.Ū * is strictly convex on Ū * * ′ (x) : x ∈ (β, ∞) . We claim that Ū * * ′ (x) : x ∈ (β, ∞) = 0, (Ū * * ) ′ (β) . Indeed, Ū * * ′ is nonincreasing, and for x > max{a + 1 , β}
Thus, since g as convex, nonconstant and nondecreasing function, it has to satisfy lim x→∞ g(x) = ∞. It follows by the Inada condition at ∞ that 0 ≤ Ū * * ′ (∞) ≤ U ′ (∞) = 0. For the right hand of the domain of strict convexity ofŪ * we have to consider three cases: If U(0) = −∞, then we have Ū * * ′ (β) = ∞, sinceŪ(β) =Ū * * (β) = −∞ and we get (Ū * * ) ′ (x) : x ∈ (β, ∞) = (0, ∞). If U(0) is real and Ū * * ′ (β) = ∞, then we can conclude in similar manner that (Ū * * ) ′ (x) : x ∈ (β, ∞) = (0, ∞). Finally, if U(0) is real and Ū * * ′ (β) < ∞ then,Ū * is strictly convex on 0, Ū * * ′ (0) . However,
Finally we have to prove the dual asymptotic ellipticity ofŪ * * . The following result builds on and generalizes (in the one-dimensional case) the equivalence result of dual and classical asymptotic elasticity given by Deelstra is finite and strictly positive. Thus we get on the one hand side that there exists to every ε > 0 some x 0 (which we will assume to be bigger then β) such that for all x > x 0 it holds that g( We note that it follows from Lemma A.2 that for x > a + 1 (and all x > β in the case of concaveŪ) that
By convex conjugacy we have x ∈ −∂Ū * (y) ⇐⇒ y = Ū * * ′ (x), and hence, since by concavity the gradient is nonincreasing, we see that : We finally consider an example of incomplete market. Similar to Example B.1 let W be a onedimensional Brownian motion defined on some probability space (Ω, F , P) and denote by F W t the filtration generated by it, augmented by all P-negligible sets (as usual we assume without loss of generality that F W T = F ). Let N ∈ N and consider a random variable X independent of F such that P X = i = p i , i = 1, .., N, where p i > 0 and Let the money market account be given by dB t = r t B t dt; B 0 = 1, for some bounded progressive interest process r and conditioned on X = i define the market price of risk θ through
Then the set of all equivalent local martingale measures M e is given by 
